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L Introduction
Real estate sellers and their brokers were traditionally not required to disclose
any information about property because the controlling doctrine was caveat emptor.
The protection provided by that doctrine has gradually been eroded by judicial
application of the theory of common law fraud,' under which sellers are required
to disclose conditions that the buyer could not be expected to discover by a
diligent inspection, but which the seller knows or should know would materially
affect the value of the property to the buyer. That disclosure obligation has been
expanded in some states to the listing broker and the selling broker.2 In response,
brokers have made a concerted effort to shift the burden onto sellers by enacting
state statutes requiring sellers to make written disclosures about property conditions.'
© Copyright 1997. All Rights Reserved. Ronald Benton Brown
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort Lauderdale,
Fla. LL.M., 1976, Temple University; J.D., 1973, University of Connecticut; B.S.M.E., 1970,
Northeastern University.
** Goodwin Research Assistant and member of the Class of 1997, Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
1. See Quintin Johnstone, Major Issues In Real Property Law, 55 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1990); Robert M.
Morgan, The Expansion of the Common Law Duty of Disclosure in Real Estate Transactions: It's Not
Just for Sellers Anymore, 68 FLA. BJ. 28 (Feb. 1994); Paula C. Murray, The Real Estate Broker and the
Buyer: Negligence and the Duty to Investigate, 32 VILL. L. REv. 939 (1987); Kevin C. Culum, Comment,
Hidden-But-Discoverable Defects: Resolving the Conflicts Between Real Estate Buyers and Brokers, 50
MoNT. L. REv. 331 (1989); Richard M. Jones, Comment, Risk Allocation and the Sale of Defective Used
Housing in Ohio-Should Silence be Golden?, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 215 (1991);.
2. See Clarance E. Hagglund & Britton D. Weimer, Caveat Realtor: The Broker's Liability for
Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentations, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 149 (1991). But see Robert M. Zeit,
Comment, Real Estate - Broker Liability to Purchasers - Herbert v. Saffel, 877 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1989),
63 TaMp. L. REV. 165 (1990).
3. See James D. Lawlor, Seller Beware: Burden of Disclosing Defects Shifting to Sellers, 78
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Psychological irrpact property statutes began to appear in the late 1980s, after
the notorious Reed v. King4 and Stambovsky v. Ackley' cases. In Reed, a home
purchaser in California was not informed that the property had been the site of a
multiple murder ten years earlier. The buyer, Reed, sought rescission and damages.
The trial court found that the complaint failed to allege concealment of a material
fact.' The court of appeal reversed, holding that the purchaser had stated a cause
of action for rescission and damages based on fraud.' The court was careful not
to endorse reliance on "the materiality of facts predicating peripheral, insubstantial,
or fancied harms.'" The critical question was, as the court put it: "[D]oes the
seller have a duty to disclose... ? The court reasoned that the buyer could not
reasonably be expected to anticipate the possibility that murder had occurred on
the property, so she should not be charged with the duty to inquire into and
discover that fact."0 Consequently, the court ruled that on remand Reed would be
entitled to a favorable ruling if she could show that the murders had a significant
negative effect on the market value of the property."
In Stambovsky, a purchaser sued for rescission of the purchase contract and
damages on learning that the house he had contracted to buy had a wide-spread
reputation as being haunted. 2 New York applied the doctrine of caveat emptor,
so the seller had no duty to disclose conditions about the premises unless there was
a confidential or fiduciary duty between the parties, or the seller had engaged in
active concealment. 3 However, the Stambovsky court concluded that the seller
was estopped to deny the haunting because the seller had announced it to local
media and Readers' Digest.14 The court suggested that this was merely a logical
extension of the doctrine that a seller who makes a partial disclosure is obligated
to make a complete. and full disclosure to avoid being misleading. 5 Furthermore,
the court stated:
A.B.A.J. 90 (1992); Paula C. Murray, What Constitutes A Defect in Real Property?, 22 REAL EST. L.J.
61 (1993); Katherine A Pancak et al., Residential Disclosure Laws: The Further Demise of Caveat
Emptor, 24 REAL EST. LJ. 291 (1996); John H. Scheid, Jr., Mandatory Disclosure Law: A Statute for
Illinois, 27 J. MARSHALL. L. REv. 155 (1993); Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition
Disclosure Legislation, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 381 (1995); Alan M. Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well
Informed? - Doubting fhe Demise of Caveat Emptor, 55 MD. L. REV. 387 (1996); Daivia S. Kasper,
Note, Ohio's Homeowner Disclosure Law, 45 CASE W. RES. L. Ray. 1149 (1995); Carolyn L. Mueller,
Legislative Note, Ohio Revised Code Section 5302.30: Real Property Transferor Disclosure - A Form
Without Substance, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 783 (1994).
4. 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1983).
5. 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1991).
6. See Reed, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
7. See id. at 134.
8. Id. at 133.
9. Id. at 131.
10. See id. at 133.
11. See id, at 134.
12. See Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
13. See id at 675.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 67 (discussing Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 178 N.E. 672 (N.Y. 1931)).
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Where a condition which has been created by the seller materially
impairs the value of the contract and is particularly within the
knowledge of the seller or is unlikely to be discovered by a prudent
purchaser exercising due care with respect to the subject transaction,
nondisclosure constitutes a basis for rescission as a matter of equity.'
6
The court held, however, there was no cause of action against the listing broker.
As the agent of the seller, the broker had no duty to disclose facts about the
property to the buyer. 7
The presence of ghosts or a history of murders might scare away some buyers
or lower the market value to those who are willing to buy because of the smaller
pool of prospective buyers for a possible resale. But hauntings or murders are not
the most serious of the events that might make a property less marketable.
Ownership or prior occupancy of the property by a person inflicted with AIDS or
the HIV virus might have a similar effect, despite assurances by public health
officials that the next occupant would not be at any risk. This might lead to the
conclusion that AIDS or HIV infection is a material fact that the seller and his or
her broker should disclose."
Amendments to the Fair Housing Act in 1988 added uncertainty to disclosure
obligations in real estate transactions involving prior occupants who were
diagnosed with AIDS. 9 The amendments expanded the prohibition against
discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of dwellings to cover discrimination
based on handicap. If the property of AIDS or HIV victims would significantly
lose value, perhaps even becoming worthless, it would have the effect of freezing
those victims out of the real estate market based upon their disease. Arguably,
disclosing that information would be a violation of Fair Housing.' Real estate
agents were unsure whether the amendments prohibited the unsolicited disclosure
of these facts. The National Association of Realtors (NAR) requested the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to clarify the issue."
HUD responded that unsolicited disclosure of a seller's AIDS infection would
violate the Fair Housing Act However, the ruling did not answer whether an
agent could respond to a direct inquiry concerning AIDS from a potential buyer.
To be safe, NAR advised its members not to respond to such inquiries.'
16. Id. at 676.
17. See id. at 674-75.
18. See Michael Adam Burger & Lourdes 1. Reyes Rosa, Your Money and Your Life! AIDS and
Real Estate Disclosure Statutes, 5 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 349 (1993); Sharlene A. McEvoy, Caveat Emptor
Redux: "Psychologically Impacted" Property Statutes, 18 W. ST. U. L. REV. 579 (1991); Sharlene A.
MeEvoy, Stigmatized Property: What a Buyer Should Know, 48 J. MO. BAR 57 (1992); Paula C. Murray,
Aids, Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Disclose?, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689
(1992).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).
20. See Op. Att'y Gen. of Tex., No. JM-1093, at 5725 (Sept. 5, 1989).
21. See Annemarie Roketenetz, Stigmatized Property: Know the Legal Boundaries, REAL EST.
TODAY, Apr. 1991, at 28.
22. See id; Linn Allen, New Rules Help Protect Realty Agents, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 1991, at Cl.
23. See Roketenetz, supra note 21, at 28. NAR recommended the following language:
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In response to the uncertainty created by case law and the Fair Housing Act,
twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia passed laws to provide protection
for brokers and sellers involved with psychologically impacted property.'
California began the trend in 1987. The NAR subsequently adopted a policy to
encourage states to pass such legislation and drafted model legislation that declared
psychological impacts "not material facts."' But these statutes are not a panacea.
The stigmatizing events are not uniform. Some statutes are overly complex. Some
statutes provide procedures that allow buyers to inquire about stigmatizing events
if the buyer follows the proper procedure. Not all protect both the brokers and
sellers. None makes clear whether the brokers should or can inform buyers about
the existence of these shield laws, which places diligent brokers in an awkward
position. This article will review and contrast the current statutes. A chart is
included as an appendix to aid the reader in obtaining an overview of the law.
Then, following an analysis of the statutes' unintended negative effects, a solution
is proposed.
II. State Statutes Relating to Stigmatized Property
Shield statutes involving stigmatized property typically have two provisions.
First, they remove the duty to disclose certain psychological impacts relating to
real estate transactions. Second, they prohibit a cause of action against various
persons for failing to disclose certain psychological impacts. The duty to disclose
is abrogated by declaring that psychological impacts enumerated in the statute are
"not a material fact" that must be disclosed in a real estate transaction.' Persons
protected from a cause of action may include the transferors, owners, brokers,
salespersons, or other agents, lessees, and sublessees, or any other persons involved
in the transaction. Delaware even prohibits a cause of action against the agent of
a transferee for failing to inquire about psychological impactsY Although most
statutes prevent a cause of action against an owner or the owner's agent, five
statese protect only real estate brokers or salespersons and do not mention the
transferor. Perhaps this is because these statutes are usually located within chapters
relating to licensing real estate brokers and salespeople.
Under these shield laws, property may be classified as "psychological impacted"
or the like as the result of a dramatic event occurring on the property or the
disease of the property's prior occupant. The typical impacts are suicide, homicide,
or other felonies, and infection of the prior occupant with Human Immunodeficien-
It is our firm policy not to answer inquiries of this nature one way or another, since the
firm feels that this information is not material to the transaction. In addition, any type of
response may be a violation of fair housing laws. You will have to find out this
information through other sources.
Id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See CONN. Gel STAT. § 20-329dd(a) (1995).
27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2929(e).
28. Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, and Texas.
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cy Virus (HIV), Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), or any other
disease that is not known to be transmitted through common occupancy. Some
states extend coverage to other deaths occurring on the property whether by natural
or accidental causes. Although Nevada and Texas are included in this group,
they require the disclosure of a death that resulted from a condition on the
property." Still other states protect disclosure of gang activity, the manufacture
or distribution of illegal substances, or the discharge of a firearm on the
property.'
Despite limiting the duty to disclose psychological impacts and prohibiting
causes of action, many statutes reiterate that the protections afforded sellers and
agents should not be construed to allow persons to make misrepresentations of
fact. 2 For example, an agent, when asked of the fact, cannot erroneously deny
that a suicide occurred on the property.
A. Notable Provisions
1. Arizona
In 1996, the Arizona legislature removed the language from the state's
psychologically impacted property statute that limited protection of real estate
agents to licensees "acting on behalf of a transferor."33 Thus, transferee's agents
are now protected from causes of action under the statute. The statute-does not
expressly limit the duty of sellers and real estate agents to disclose psychological
impacts.' However, it does prevent causes of action against sellers or real estate
agents for failing to disclose such occurrences. 5 In addition to the common
elements of homicide, any other felony, or suicide, AIDS, HIV, and any other
disease not transmitted through common occupancy, Arizona's statute includes
natural death at the property in its list of psychological impacts. Additionally,
Arizona expressly prohibits recision of a transaction for not disclosing the
psychological impacts included in the statute.'
29. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-2156(A)(1) (Supp. 1996); Cal. Civ. Code § 1710.2(a) (West
Supp. 1997); IND. CODE § 24-4.6-2.1-2(1) (1995); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 17-322.1(a)(2)
(Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. 3 § 40.770(1)(a) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-13-2(A) (Michie 1995);
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 443-a(1)(b) (McKinney Supp 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-50 (Supp. 1995);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40- 57-270(A) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, §
15E(2) (Vest 1996).
30. See discussion of Nevada infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text, and Texas infra notes 175-
77 and accompanying text.
31. See discussion of Indiana infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
32. See discussion of Colorado infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text; Illinois, infra notes 79-80
and accompanying text; Michigan, infra notes 101-09 and accompanying text; Missouri, notes 110-14
and accompanying text; and Texas, infra 175-77 and accompanying text.
33. 1996 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 299, § 2 (West).
34. See ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-2156 (West Supp. 1996).
35. See id. § 32-2156(A).
36. See id. § 32-2156(B).
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2. California
In 1986 the California legislature passed a stigmatized property statute37 in
response to the uncertainty created by cases such as Reed v. King." In Reed, the
California Third District Court of Appeal held that a purchaser had stated a cause
of action for rescission and damages based on the failure of the seller and his real
estate agent to disclose that the property was psychologically impacted." Ten
years before the sale, a mother and her four children had been murdered on the
property. Under California's stigmatized property statute, owners, owners' agents,
and transferees' agents are now immune from actions based on the failure to
disclose psychological impacts listed in the statute. In the case of deaths, however,
the statute only applies to the death of the prior occupant that occurred on the
property "more than three years prior."' With the exception of Hawaii's statute
concerning real estate disclosure statements,4' California is the only state that
distinguishes a recent death on a property from a death that occurred several years
in the past.
Like many other states, California's statute clarifies that nothing in the section
shall be construed to allow owners and agents to make intentional misrepresen-
tations of fact in response to an inquiry.4z Interestingly, however, the language in
the subsection is only "concerning deaths on the real property."'43 The absence of
language concerning disease of the prior occupant could be viewed by some as
permission to make intentional misrepresentations concerning AIDS or HIV.
3. Colorado
In 1991 Colorado added a section that is not unusual to its statutes regarding
psychological impacts." The initial subsection states that circumstances relating
to the property are not material facts if they could "psychologically impact or
37. CAL. Cv. CODE § 1710.2 (West Supp. 1997)
38. 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1983). Chapter 498, section 2 of the Statutes of California
provides:
(e) The applicability of cases such as Reed v. King, 145 CA 3d 261, which deals with the
obligation of a seller of real property to disclose facts materially affecting the value or
desirability of the property, is not clear as to situations where previous owners or
inhabitants of Peal property have been afflicted with AIDS. The Legislature intends to
clarify this situation by the enactment of this act.
1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 498, § 2.
39. See Reed, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
40. CAL CIV. CODE § 1710.2(a) (West Supp. 1997).
41. HAW. REV. SrAT. § 508D-8 (listing material facts to be omitted from real estate disclosure
statements); see discussion of the Hawaii statute infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
42. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710.2(d) (West Supp. 1997).
43. Section 1710.2(d) provides: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to immunize an owner
or his or her agent from making an intentional misrepresentation in response to a direct inquiry from a
transferee or a prospetive transferee of real property, concerning deaths on the real property." Id.
(emphasis added).
44. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35.5-101(i) (West Supp. 1996).
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stigmatize such property.' 5 The statute then outlines facts that could represent
such impacts. The list consists of the most common factors found in other state
statutes: AIDS or HIV status of the prior occupant, or any other disease that is
highly unlikely to be transmitted through common occupancy; or homicide, any
other felony, or a suicide, on the property. This list is not limiting, however. Thus,
other circumstances relating to a piece of property in Colorado could arguably be
considered "stigmatizing."
The second subsection of Colorado's statute immunizes real estate brokers and
salespersons from actions based on failure to disclose the types of impacts
described in the statue.' This too is similar to many other states' statutes.
However, Colorado, like only a few other states,47 fails to provide similar
immunity for the seller.
4. Connecticut
The 1990 statute s defines "psychologically impacted" by a list of possible*
circumstances that trigger the protection of the statute.49 Section 20-329dd(a)
makes such psychological impacts not a material fact subject to disclosure. Section
20-329dd(b) prevents causes of action against owners and agents for failure to
disclose to the transferee that a property was psychologically impacted.
Section 20-329ee provides the detailed process by which a potential transferee
may find out about psychological impacts regarding real estate.' A potential
transferee making a bona fide offer may notify the seller in writing that a
psychological impact is relevant to the purchase decision. The seller, through his
or her agent, must respond in writing,' or in the alternative, may decide not to
disclose such information.' Under this alternative, the statute directs the seller's
agent to notify the buyer of the decision to remain silent, which, of course, would
be a red flag to the buyer. However, the statute does not address what happens if
the seller is not represented by an agent.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 38-35.5-101(2).
47. Illinois, Michigan, Montana, and Texas.
48. 1990 Conn. Pub. Acts 141 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-329cc to -329ff).
49. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-329cc (West Supp. 1996).
50. Section 20-329ee provides:
Notwithstanding sections 20-329cc and 20-329dd, if a purchaser or lessee of real estate,
who was in the process of making a bona fide offer, advises an owner of real estate or
his or her agent, in writing, that knowledge of a psychological impact is important to his
decision to purchase or lease the property, the owner through his or her agent shall report
any findings to the purchaser or lessee, in writing subject to and consistent with applicable
laws of privacy. If the owner refuses to disclose such information, his or her agent shall
so advise the purchaser or lessee in writing.
Id. § 20-329ee.
51. See id.
52. See iU.
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5. Delaware
Delaware's statute 53 relating to psychological impacted property seems to be the
most comprehensive. The statute defines "psychological impact" with a list of
circumstances including: homicide, other felony, or suicide; the AIDS or HIV
status of the prior occupant; or "any other disease which has been determined by
medical evidence to be highly unlikely to be transmitted through the occupancy of
a dwelling place."' Subsection 2929(d) declares that these psychological impacts
are not a material fact in a real estate transaction.5 Subsection 2929(e) has a
typical provision providing immunity for failing to disclose psychological impacts.
However, the provision is unique in that it lists many protected parties (owner,
appraiser, owner's agent, and transferee's agent) and is the only statute to offer
protection to parties involved for failing to inquire about psychological impacts.'
Like Connecticut's statute,' subsection 2929(f) of the Delaware statute outlines
a detailed process for a potential transferee to inquire about psychological
impacts.58 With regard to these inquiries, Delaware treats the two types of
psychological impacts differently. First, if a potential transferee makes a written
inquiry about impacts related to deaths or crimes, the statute directs the owner or
owner's agent to answer truthfully, 9 but the agent has no duty to inquire about
these type of impa.zts unless the transferee has made the request. Thus, this section
may be reconciled with the previous section which immunized an agent from a
cause of action for failing to inquire. If the transferee makes a request, subsection
(f) states that the agent has the duty to inquire; however, subsection (e) states that
there shall be no cause of action for failing to inquire. Second, if a potential
transferee makes an inquiry regarding the disease of the prior occupant, "[t]he
agent shall not make any disclosure concerning those psychological impacts."'
Once again, this covers only the agents. The statute is silent as to whether the
owner must disclose, or at least respond, to the inquiry.
53. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2929 (Supp. 1996).
54. Id. § 2929(b)(2).
55. See id. § 2929(d).
56. See id. § 2929(e).
57. See supra text accompanying note 50.
58. Subsections 2929(f)-(g) provide:
(f) If a potential transferee makes a specific written request to the owner or agent about
the psychological impacts defined above in subsection (b)(1) of this section [homicide,
suicide, other felony] regarding a specific property, the owner or agent shall answer the
transferees quewtions truthfully, to the best of such owner's or agent's knowledge. The
agent shall hay, no duty to inquire about the psychological impacts defined above in
subsection (b)(,) of this section regarding a specific property unless a transferee, in
writing, specifically requests the agent to ask the owner for such information.
(g) The agent shall not make any disclosure concerning those psychological impacts
defined above in subsection (b)(2) of this section [AIDS, HIV] even if a buyer specifically
asks about such psychological impacts.
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 24, § 2929(f)-(g) (Supp. 1996).
59. See id.
60. Id. § 2929(g).
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6. District of Columbia
The District of Columbia statute covering real estate and business chance
licenses contains a typical psychological impact provision.6, Section 45-1936(f)(1)
states facts that do not need to be disclosed in a real estate transaction despite the
fact that they may constitute a psychological impact.' The District of Columbia
provides protection when property might be impacted by an occupant with AIDS,
HIV, or any other disease that is not transmitted through common occupancy, and
property that has been the site of a homicide, any other felony, or a suicide.'
Section 45-1936(f)(2) prohibits causes of action against various agents and owners
for failure to disclose psychological impacts mentioned in the statute.'
7. Florida
Florida has a very limited psychological impact statute.' Only the AIDS or
HIV status of the prior occupant is made a nonmaterial fact that does not have to
be disclosed in a real estate transaction. Causes of action are also prohibited
against owners, transferors' agents, and transferees' agents for failing to disclose
these two psychological impacts. The statute extends neither to other diseases that,
like AIDS and HIV virus, are not transmitted through common occupancy, nor to
crime/death-type psychological impacts such as homicides, other felonies, or
suicide.
8. Georgia
Georgia's psychological impact statute prohibits causes of action against owners
and owners' agents for failing to disclose psychological impacts covered in the
subsections of the statute." The statute lacks the typical provision that redun-
61. The District of Columbia statute provides:
(f)(1) Notwithstanding the possibility that a fact may have a psychological impact on
a purchaser, lessee, or sublessee, it shall not be a material fact that must be disclosed in
a real estate transaction that:
(A) An occupant of real property, at any time, was infected or was or is suspected to
have been infected with a human immune deficiency virus;
(B) An occupant of real property, at any time, has been diagnosed, was infected, or
was suspected to have been diagnosed as having acquired immune deficiency syndrome
or any other disease that has been determined by medical evidence to be highly unlikely
to be transmitted through occupancy of property alone; or
(C) The property, at any time, has been or was suspected to have been the site of a
suicide, homicide, or other felony.
(2) A cause of action shall not arise against an owner of real property, a real estate
broker, a real estate salesperson, a property manager, a lessee, or sublessee for the failure
to disclose to the purchaser, lessee, or sublessee that the real property was the site of any
circumstances described in paragraph (1) of this subsection.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1936(0 (1996).
62. See id. § 45-1936(0(1).
63. See id.
64. See id. § 45-1936(f)(2).
65. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 689.25 (1995).
66. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16 (1996).
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dantly declares such circumstances nonmaterial facts whose disclosure is not
required. Subsection 44-1-16(1) covers disease-type psychological impacts. It does
not specifically mzntion HIV or AIDS, but they are logically included in the
statutory circumstance of any prior occupant "infected with a virus or any other
disease which has been determined by medical evidence as being highly unlikely
to be transmitted through the occupancy of a dwelling place."' In addition,
subsection 44-1-16(2) lists the typical crime/death-type psychological impacts, i.e.,
homicide or other felony and suicide. s However, the statute specifies that an
owner or owner's agent cannot make an intentional misrepresentation of fact
regarding the history of the property. In Georgia, an owner or agent must "answer
truthfully" in response to a question concerning psychological impacts even though
their nondisclosure is protected by Georgia law.' The seller does have the option
to remain silent in response to such a question from the prospective buyer, but it
seems to be a meaningless option considering the red flag silence would raise for
a buyer concerned enough to ask the question."
9. Hawaii
Hawaii has addressed psychological impacts in its statute relating to the
revocation of real estate licenses."1 Under the statute, the Hawaii Real Estate
Commission may sanction agents for "[flailing to ascertain and disclose all
material facts" related to a property.' However, the statute excepts the AIDS,
AIDS-related complex, or EIV status of a prior occupant from what may otherwise
be "material facts."' Even though Hawaii law prevents the revocation of a real
estate license for failure to disclose disease-type psychological impacts, it does not
expressly prevent causes of action against agents and owners for failing to disclose
such circumstances.
There is some inconsistency in Hawaii law on this subject. Hawaii law requires
sellers to provide buyers a disclosure statement within ten days of the acceptance
of an offer.74 This statute provides that these disease-type impacts are "material
facts," but they may be excluded from the real estate disclosure statement 5 in
contrast to section 20-329cc, the Connecticut real estate licensing law discussed
above, that declares disease-type psychological impacts "not material facts."76
Section 508D-8 also excludes crime/death-type impacts from mandatory disclosure
in the statement,2 except that homicides, felonies, or suicides that occurred on the
67. Id. § 44-1-16(1).
68. See id. § 44-1-16(2).
69. Id.
70. See supra text accompanying note 50.
71. HAw. REv. STA.T. § 467-14(18) (1995).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 508D-5 (Supp. 1994).
75. See id. § 503D-8.
76. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
77. Section 508D-8 provides:
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property within three years of the sale must be included in the disclosure
statement. 8
10. Illinois
Illinois has a brief section relating to psychologically impacted pfoperty in its
real estate licensing statute.' The statute prohibits causes of action against real
estate licensees for failing to disclose that a prior occupant was infected with the
HIV virus or "that the property was the site of an act or occurrence which had no
effect on the physical condition of the property.' The section 20-329cc catchall
provision clearly includes both disease-type and crime/death-type impacts on the
property.
11. Indiana
Indiana's psychologically impacted property statute" is the most expansive
concerning crime/death-type impacts. In the list of psychological impacts, the
statute simply states "an individual died on the property."' Thus, homicide,
suicide, accidental, and natural death are all included. Section 24-4.6-2.1-2(1) adds
the fact the prior occupant died or was afflicted with a disease related to 1HIV.'
However, section 24-4.6-2.1-2(3) goes beyond felonies by listing as psychological
impacts criminal gang activity, the discharge of a firearm involving the police, and
the manufacture or distribution of illegal drugs on the property.U This addition
is unusual. That these activities occurred on the property may impact the property
in a way that is not purely psychological. Criminal activity on the property may
Except as otherwise provided by law the following material facts may be excluded from
the statement:
(1) An occupant of the subject property was afflicted with acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS) or AIDS related complex (ARC), or had been tested for human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV);
(2) The real property was the site of an act or occurrence that had no effect on the
physical structure or the physical environment of the real property, or the improvements
located on the real property; or
(3) A homicide, felony, or suicide occurred on the real property more than three years
before the date the seller signed the statement.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 508D-8 (Supp. 1994).
78. See id.
79. 225 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 455/31.1 (West 1993).
80. I.
81. IND. CODE § 24-4.6-2.1-2 (1996).
82. I. § 24-4.6-2.1-2(2) (Michie 1996).
83. See id § 24-4.6-2.1-2(1).
84. See id. § 24-4.6-2.1-2(3). The subsection provides:
(3) That the property was the site of:
(A) A felony under IC 35;
(B) Criminal gang (as defined in IC 35-45-9-1) activity;
(C) The discharge of a firearm involving a law enforcement officer while engaged in
the officer's official duties; or
(D) The illegal manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance.
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indicate that there is more criminal activity in the area. There are legitimate
reasons to know about ongoing gang activity that is located nearby or that drugs
were once sold on the property, leading to the legitimate fear that drug buyers will
return for another transaction, not realizing the change in ownership. This activity
could have a real impact on the future use and enjoyment of the property.
However, an owner or agent has no duty to disclose any of the above psycholo-
gical impacts to a transferee in Indiana,' and the statute protects owners and
agents from liability for refusing to disclose psychological impacts."5 Like many
state statutes, the Indiana code reiterates that the owner or transferor cannot
intentionally misrepresent a fact concerning a psychologically affected property in
response to a direct inquiry from a transfereeY
12. Kentucky
The Kentucky statute deals only with the AIDS or HIV status of the prior
occupant.' Section 207.250(1) makes the HIV or AIDS status of the prior
occupant not a material fact, so there is no requirement to disclose it." Section
207.250(2) prevents causes of action against owners, owners' agents, and
transferees' agents for failure to disclose the HIV or AIDS status of the prior
occupant.'
13. Louisiana
Louisiana has a typical, straightforward psychological impacted property
statute.9' Section 1468(A) lists "facts or suspicions" that cause property to be
psychologically impacted. These include, but are not limited to: 1) the fact that
an occupant of the property was infected with AIDS, HIV, or any other disease
"which has been determined by medical evidence to be highly unlikely to be
transmitted through the occupancy of a dwelling place" and 2) the fact that the
property was the site of a homicide or other felony, or a suicide.' Section
1468(A) continues, declaring that these impacts are not material facts that must be
disclosed.' Louisiana's statute also prohibits causes of action against owners and
their agents for failure to disclose psychological impacts.'
14. Maryland
Provisions for psychologically impacted property appear in two separate titles
of the Code of Maryland. Virtually identical sections appear under the Real
85. See id. § 24-4.6-2.1-4.
86. See id. § 24-4.6-2.1-5.
87. See id.
88. See KY. REv. SrAT. ANN. § 207.250 (Banks-Baldwin 1991).
89. See id. § 207.250(1).
90. See idU § 207.250(2).
91. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1468 (West Supp. 1997).
92. See id.
93. See id. § 37:14(8(A).
94. See id. § 1468(11).
[Vol. 49:625
PSYCHOLOGICALLY TAINTED PROPERTIES
Property Code 8 and the Business Occupations and Professions Code.' Subsec-
tions (a) of both statutes define matters that do not constitute a material fact in real
estate transactions.' These are the AIDS or HIV status of a prior occupant and
the fact that a "homicide, suicide, natural death, or felony occurred on the
property."8 The two sections differ by what type of immunity they expressly
provide. Subsection 2-120(b) of the Real Property Code provides sellers, owners,
and owners' agents with immunity from civil and criminal liability for failure to
disclose psychological impacts listed in the previous subsection." Subsection 17-
322.1(b) of the Business Occupations and Professions Code provides brokers and
salespersons with immunity from disciplinary action and personal liability for
failure to disclose psychological impacts.i
15. Michigan
Michigan's occupational code protects real estate brokers and salespersons from
causes of action for failing to disclose psychological impacts.'' There are no such
protections given to owners/transferors elsewhere in the Michigan statutes. The
statute separates disease-type and death/crime-type impacts in two subsections.
Subsection 339.2518(a) covers disease-type impacts by referring to the Fair Housing
Act."° Michigan is one of only two states to refer to the Fair Housing Act instead
of listing disease-type impacts such as AIDS or HIVE°3 Under this subsection real
estate agents are protected from causes of action for failing to disclose the handicap
of a prior occupant as defined by the Fair Housing Act and "disclosure of which
would constitute unlawful discrimination under, sections 804,[' ° ] 805,[ °5]
806,[" ] or 818["'] ... of the Act."'"5  Subsection 339.2518(b) covers crime/
95. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-120 (1996).
96. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 17-322.1 (Supp. 1996).
97. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-120(a) (1996); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF.
§ 17-322.1(a) (Supp. 1996).
98. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-120(a)(1)-(2) (1996). The language of MD. CODE ANN.,
Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 17-322.1(a)(l)-(2) (Supp. 1996) is identical.
99. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-120(b) (1996).
100. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 17.322.1(b) (Supp. 1996).
101. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 339.2518 (1996).
102. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2342 (1994)). The Fair Housing Act defines "handicap" as:
(h) "Handicap" means, with respect to a person -
(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities,
(2) a record of having such an impairment, or
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment,
but such term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled
substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).
42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1994).
103. See MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 339.2518(a) (1996). The Wisconsin psychologically impacted
property statute also refers to the Fair Housing Act. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 452.23(i) (West. Supp. 1996).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994) ("Sale or Rental of Housing").
105. ld. § 3605 ("Residential Real Estate-Related Transactions").
106. Id. § 3606 ("Provision of Brokerage Services").
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death-type impacts. These are homicide, suicide, or other unlawful acts "which had
no material effect on the condition of the real property or improvements.""lw
16. Missouri
Missouri has a typical psychologically impacted property statute. " ' The first
subsection states that the fact that a parcel of real property is psychologically
impacted is not a material fact that must be disclosed in a real estate transac-
tion.' The second subsection defines "psychologically impacted" to include
disease-type and crime/death-type psychological impacts."' The disease-type
impacts are the same ones most prevalent in other states' statutes - HIV, AIDS,.
and "any other disease which has been determined by medical evidence to be
highly unlikely to be transmitted through the occupancy of a dwelling place.""'
The common death/crime-type impacts are found in the second subsection -
namely the fact that the property was the site of a homicide or other felony, or a
suicide. The third subsection prohibits causes of action against only real estate
agents and brokers for failure to disclose psychological impacts."4 The statute
does not mention protection of sellers.
17. Nevada
Nevada's statute concerning psychologically impacted property contains the
typical provisions."' Subsection 44.770(1) enumerates disease-type and
crime/death-type impacts which are not material to real estate transactions."6
Crime/death-type impacts are homicide, suicide, or death by any other cause (or
the fact that the property was the site of a felony)."' Only four other states"'
deem any death on a piece of property a psychological impact. It is particularly
noteworthy that Nevada excepts from the psychologically impacted category deaths
that occur as a result of a condition of the property."' Disease-type impacts
include the fact that the property was occupied by a person exposed to HIV or
AIDS, or any other disease not transmitted through common occupancy.'2"
0
107. 1ld § 3617 ("Interference, Coercion, or Intimidation").
108. MicH. COMP. LAws § 339.2518(a) (1996).
109. Id. § 339.2518(b).
110. Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.600 (1996).
111. See id. § 442.600(1).
112. See id § 442.600(2).
113. Id.
114. See id. § 442.630(3).
115. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 40.770 (1995).
116. See id. § 40.77,0(1).
117. See id. § 40.77,3(1)(a).
118. California, Indiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Texas excepts an accidental death that
occurred as a result of a condition on the property. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a § 15E
(West Supp. 1997).
119. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 40.770(1)(a) (1995).
120. See id. § 40.771)(1)(b).
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Subsection 44.770(2) prevents causes of action against sellers and sellers' agents
for failure to disclose psychological impacts. Subsection 44.770(3) similarly
provides such protection to buyers' agents unless "otherwise provided in an
agreement between a buyer and his agent."'' Only a sophisticated buyer, or one
who sought advice from a real estate lawyer before beginning to work with the
broker, would know to get that agreement. It is unlikely that the broker would
suggest such an agreement, and it is from the brokers that most buyers get their
advice before signing the contract.
18. New Hampshire
New Hampshire's statute regarding psychological impact is unique.'" It
addresses only death/crime-type impacts. Disease-type impacts are not included.
The statute provides that an owner or owner's agent "shall not be required to
disclose ... [that the] property was a site of a homicide, other felony, or a suicide,
unless the buyer requests such information of the owner or agent and the owner
or agent has knowledge. .. .,"' Thus, buyers in New Hampshire must know to
ask the right question if this information would be important to them. In effect,
New Hampshire protects sellers and agents from causes of action for failing to
disclose death/crime-type psychological impacts.
Interestingly, the statute expressly protects owners and owners' agents from
causes of action for disclosing (not failing to disclose) psychological impacts at the
request of the buyer.'"' Who would want to sue an owner for disclosing such
information? One could speculate that the seller might sue an agent who disclosed
the information for the lost sale or for breach of a fiduciary duty. Conversely, the
agent might sue the seller for loss of a commission caused by the seller's
disclosure of these facts to an otherwise ready, willing, and able buyer. However,
subsection II of the statute states that sellers and owners are "free to negotiate
contractual rights of disclosure."'" Thus, a seller and the listing agent in New
Hampshire could agree to disclose or not.
19. New Mexico
New Mexico's psychologically impacted property statutes are, perhaps, the most
exact. They list the types of persons protected by the statutes, persons to whom
no duty is owed, and types of possible psychological impacts.'" Section 47-13-2
protects "[a] seller, lessor or landlord of real property, including a participant in
an exchange of real property and any agent involved in such a transaction."'27
Under the statute, such persons have no duty to disclose psychological impacts and
are not liable for failure to disclose psychological impacts enumerated in the
121. ld. § 40.770(3).
122. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 477:4-e (Supp. 1996).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. See id. § 477:4-e(1)(b).
125. Id. § 477:4-e(II).
126. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-13-2, -3 (Michie 1995).
127. Id.
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statute." Psychological impacts under the statute are natural death; the fact that
the property was le site of a homicide, suicide, assault, sexual battery, or other
felony; or owned or occupied by a person who may have had HIV, AIDS, or any
other disease not transmitted by common occupancy." Furthermore, section 47-
13-3(A) states that "no cause of action shall arise" against the same persons
described in section 47-13-2 for failing to disclose the same psychological impacts
described in that section."' Additionally, section 47-13-3(B) states that failure to
disclose psychological impacts "shall not be grounds for rescission..
20. New York
In 1995, the New York Legislature passed its statute protecting transferors of
psychologically impacted property and their agents who fail to disclose the fact.' 2
Around the time of the law's passage, news stories reported that New York was
passing a "haunted house" statute. 3 However, nothing in the statute refers to
haunted houses."4 The law is simply a psychologically impacted property statute
that is similar to statutes in other jurisdictions.
The clamor about a proposed "haunted house" statue has its origins in the New
York case Stambovsky v. Ackley,"35 discussed earlier." The Stambovsky court
had reasoned that no purpose was served by requiring a buyer to discover undis-
coverable impacts that are within the knowledge of the seller.37 The buyer does
have a duty to exercise due care with respect to the transaction. However, the New
York court placed the burden on the seller in the case that a circumstance does not
affect the physical condition of the property but materially impairs the value of the
contract.' This reasoning would include all other psychological impacts
discussed in this article. Because these conditions do not affect the physical
condition of the property, they would not be discoverable by the buyer making a
reasonable inspection. Some states,'3 not including New York, have borrowed
the language of Stanbovsky for their psychologically impacted property statutes.
They specifically include any "act or occurrence which had no effect on the
physical structure of the real property."'" The New York statute does not include
this language.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Id. § 47-13-3(A).
131. Id. § 47-13-3(E).
132. See 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 606, § 1 (codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 443-a (McKinney
1996)).
133. See N.Y. Real Estate Bill Protects Owners From Telling All (National Public Radio Broadcast,
Morning Edition, July 4, 1995), Transcript # 1642-9, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
134. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 443-a (McKinney 1996).
135. 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 5-12.
137. See Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
138. See id.
139. Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
140. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-524(A)(1) (Michie 1995).
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Section 443-a(1)(a) of the New York statute makes the failure to disclose
disease-type and crime/death-type impacts not a material defect. 4' Disease-type
impacts protected under the statute are the AIDS or BIlV status of a prior occupant,
or any other disease not transmitted through occupancy of a dwelling.42 The
crime/death-type impacts under the statute are "a homicide, suicide, or other death
by accidental or natural causes, or any crime punishable by a felony."' 43 Section
443-a(2) prohibits causes of action against owners, occupants, and their agents for
failing to disclose psychological impacts.'" Real estate agents and brokers are
also immune from disciplinary action.'"
Like other states, New York codifies a procedure for buyers to make a written
inquiry if psychological impacts are important to their decision to buy.'" The
buyer or buyer's agent must provide the written inquiry to the seller or the seller's
agent. The seller may choose whether or not to respond. If the seller chooses to
respond, the seller or seller's agent must provide the response to the buyer or the
buyer's agent. 47
21. North Carolina
North Carolina has a brief statute pertaining to psychologically impacted
property. 4' The statute simply states that the fact that the prior occupant of a
property died or was seriously ill is not a material fact in a real estate transac-
tion.'49 The statute clarifies, however, that sellers cannot make a false statement
regarding a prior occupant."
22. Oklahoma
Oklahoma addresses psychologically impacted property in its real estate license
code.' Subsection 858-513(A) makes psychological impacts not a material fact
that must be disclosed in a real estate transaction." Psychological impacts, under
the statute, include but are not limited to the fact that the prior occupant had
AIDS, HIV, or other disease not transmitted through common occupancy; or that
the property was the site of a homicide, other felony, or suicide."' Subsection
858-513(B) prohibits causes of action against owners and owners' agents for failure
to disclose such impacts.'
141. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 443-a(1) (McKinney 1996).
142. See id. § 443-a(1)(a).
143. Id. § 443-a(l)(b).
144. See id. §443-a(2)(a).
145. See id. § 443-a(2)(b).
146. See id. § 443-a(3).
147. See id.
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-50 (1995).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. 59 OKLA. STAT. § 858-513 (1991).
152. See id. § 858-513(A).
153. See id.
154. See id.
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If psychological impacts are important to a buyer in Oklahoma, subsection 858-
513(C) provides a procedure for making a written request for the information. The
provision is very similar to the one provided in Connecticut."' A purchaser or
lessee may make a written request to the owner's agent. If such a request is made,
the owner's agent must ask the owner and report to the buyer, subject to privacy
law and with the seller's consent."s However, if the owner refuses to disclose the
information, the agent must notify the buyer of the seller's refusal to disclose.'5 7
23. Oregon
Oregon's property statute pertaining to psychologically impacted property is
straightforward.' Section 93.275(1) declares that psychological impacts outlined
in the statute are not material facts and that failure to disclose such will not create
a cause of action against an owner or agent.'59 Types of psychological impact
protected by the statute include the death of the prior occupant by homicide or
suicide, or the fact that the prior occupant had HIV or AIDS."w In addition, a
person may not disclose that an occupant or owner of the property has or has died
from HIV or AIDS 6. under the chapter entitled "Civil Rights; Unlawful
Employment Practices."'"
24. Rhode Island
Rhode Island has a typical statute addressing psychologically impacted
property." Section 5-20.8-6(a) declares that psychological impacts are not
material facts in a real estate transaction." Psychological impacts are defined as
including, but not limited to, the fact a prior occupant had AIDS, HIV, or other
disease not transmitted through common occupancy; or the fact that the property
was the site of a homicide or other felony, or suicide."6s Section 5-20.8-6(b)(1)
prohibits causes of action against sellers or their agents for failure to disclose
psychological impacts." Section 5-20.8-6(b)(2) clarifies that the protections
provided by the statute should not be confused as to permit a misrepresentation of
fact or false statement. 16
155. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-329ee (1996); see supra text accompanying note 50.
156. See 59 OKLA. STAT. § 858-513(C) (1991).
157. See it
158. See OR. REV. STAT. § 93.275 (1995).
159. See id. §93.275(1).
160. See id
161. See id. § 659.033 (1995).
162. Id § 659.
163. R.I. GEN. LA/s § 5-20.8-6 (1995).
164. See id. § 5-20.8-6(a).
165. See id.
166. See id. § 5-20.8-6(b)(1).
167. See id. § 5-20.8-6(b)(2).
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25. South Carolina
South Carolina also has a straightforward statute"s similar to Rhode Island's.
Section 40-57-270(A) deems psychological impacts not material facts in a real
estate transaction. Under the statute, psychological impacts include the fact or
suspicions that the prior occupant died on the property, or that the prior occupant
was afflicted with AIDS, HIV, or any other disease not transmitted through
common occupancy."6 Section 40-57-270(B) prevents causes of action against
owners and their agents for failure to disclose psychological impacts.17 Sections
40-57-270(B) and (C) clarify that owners and agents must still disclose the
physical condition of the property and may not make any intentional mis-
representations concerning psychological impacts.' Thus, sellers and agents
cannot use the statute as authority justifying a dishonest response to an inquiry by
a buyer or prospective buyer regarding psychological impacts.
26. Tennessee
The Tennessee statute' " broadly defines psychological impacts. Under Section
66-5-207, owners and real estate agents are protected from causes of action for
failure to disclose psychological impacts."7 Psychological impacts under the
statute encompass the fact that a prior occupant was afflicted with HIV or other
disease highly unlikely to be transmitted through common occupancy, or that the
property was the site of: "(1) An act or occurrence which had no effect on the
physical structure of the real property, its physical environment or the
improvements located thereon; or (2) [a] homicide, felony or suicide.' 74
27. Texas
The real estate license law in Texas addresses psychologically impacted
property.75 Psychological impacts protected by the statute are the AIDS or HIV-
related illness of the prior occupant, or the fact that a "death occurred on a
property by natural causes, suicide, or accident unrelated to the condition of the
property."'76 Under the statute, a real estate licensee has no duty to inquire about
or disclose psychological impacts enumerated in the statute."v This may be
directed at a broker or salesperson working with a seller, but it is more likely to
protect a broker who is working with a buyer, particularly a broker who is an
agent of the buyer.
168. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-270 (Law Co-op. 1993).
169. See id. § 40-57-270(A).
170. See id. § 40-57-270(B).
171. See id. § 40-57-270(B), (C).
172. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-207 (1996).
173. See id. § 66-5-207.
174. Id.
175. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § ISE (West Supp. 1997).
176. Id. § 15E(2).
177. See id. § 15E.
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28. Utah
Section 57-1-37 of the Utah Code states that: (1) the failure of an owner to
disclose that property is stigmatized is not a material fact in a property transaction
and (2) owners and their agents are not liable for failing to disclose the fact. 7'
"Stigmatized" is defined within this title as encompassing both disease-type and
crime/death-type psychological impacts." In Utah, property is "stigmatized" if
it may have been the site of a "homicide, other felony, or suicide" or the prior
occupant had or was suspected of being infected with HIV or any other disease
that has been determined not to be transferred via a dwelling."
29. Virginia
Section 55-524(A) of Virginia's Residential Property Disclosure Act' is
virtually identical to Tennessee's psychologically impacted property statute.1
2
Under the statute, owners and real estate agents are immune from causes of action
for failing to disclose that an occupant of the property was AIDS or HIV infected.
Additionally, no cause of action may arise for the failure to disclose that the
property was the site of: "(1) An act or occurrence which had no effect on the
physical structure of the real property, its physical environment or the
improvements located thereon; or (2) [a] homicide, felony or suicide.' 83
30. Wisconsin
Wisconsin's statute"' relating to disclosures in the sale of real estate affirms
that a real estate broker or salesperson "may not disclose" anything that would
constitute discrimination under the federal Fair Housing Act."' This covers the
disease-type impacts discussed in this article. To protect real estate agents from
liability for failure to disclose crime/death-type impacts, the Wisconsin statute
permits agents to not disclose any occurrences that have "no effect on the physical
condition" of a prcperty." Additionally, agents need not disclose the location of
an "adult family home" in relation to the property. This is a unique addition and,
arguably, unnecessary because a nearby group home does not effect the physical
condition of the property."'
178. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-37 (1994).
179. See id. § 57-1-1.
180. See id § 57-1-1(4).
181. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-524 (Michie 1995).
182. See TENN. CCDE ANN. § 66-5-207 (1996); see also summary of the Tennessee statute supra
notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-524(A) (Michie 1995).
184. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 452.23(1) (West Supp. 1996).
185. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2342 (1994)). See notes 101-09 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Michigan statute which also makes reference to the Fair Housing Act.
186. See Wis. STAr. ANN. § 452.23(2)(a) (West Supp. 1996).
187. See id § 452.23(2)(c).
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III. Analysis and a Proposed Solution
Buyers, sellers, and brokers have different needs and desires. Buyers want to find
properties that satisfy their needs and desires at the lowest possible price. Sellers want
to reach the widest possible group of potential buyers who are ready, willing, and able
to buy at the highest price. To satisfy these desires, buyers and sellers both need
access to the real estate market. Both buyers and sellers rely on real estate brokers to
provide market access through multiple listing systems and their real estate brokers'
expertise. Brokers are interested in matching buyers and properties so they can arrange
sales and earn commissions. Brokers hope to produce the match quickly and with a
minimum of additional expenses, e.g., advertising, to make high profits. If too much
time passes without making a match, brokers run the risk of losing clients, whether
buyers or sellers, without earning a cent, despite the investment of considerable time,
effort, and, sometimes, money. It is for this reason that brokers are so wary of the
parties being represented by lawyers whom the brokers consider to be deal breakers.
Worse for brokers is the possibility that the parties will later suffer from buyers' or
sellers' remorse over the terms of a completed transaction and blame the brokers.
Disgruntled buyers and sellers can involve the brokers in costly and embarrassing
litigation."n
For sellers, the prime cause of unhappiness is too low a price. Sellers of
psychologically stigmatized properties fear that their properties will be unmarketable
or only marketable at a price substantially below what it would bring without the
stigma. They would be angered to learn that their brokers had disclosed the stigma
to potential buyers. Brokers are also loathe to reveal the psychological stigma because
they share the sellers' fears that it may, at the least, reduce the sales price. If there is
no sale, there will be no sales commission. States that have adopted the shield statutes
have made a valid policy decision that these sellers' privacy and economic interests
deserve protection from the adverse effects of psychological taints. Protecting the
nondisclosing seller or broker appears to be the only viable mechanism for achieving
that policy short of state compensation for the loss of value.
However, buyers become disgruntled when they discover that the properties they
have bought are unsatisfactory or were acquired at too high a price. Buyers go to
brokers because, often with good reason, they believe that brokers have real estate
expertise. The public has heard that brokers know the market and about real estate.
In fact, a good broker, after a thorough interview, can quickly produce a short list of
the available properties the buyer is most likely to want and be able to afford. In the
process, good brokers provide buyers with a lot of information, e.g., information about
school systems, shopping, traffic patterns, quality of life, and neighborhood safety, that
puts the property into a realistic context. Frequently, it is this context that makes a
property attractive or not. Combined with the property condition disclosures now
required by so many states,'" all this information gives buyers the impression that
188. See Ronald Benton Brown et al., Real Estate Brokerage: Recent Changes in Relationships and
a Proposed Cure, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 25, 45-50 (1995).
189. See supra note 3.
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they have all the information needed to make the correct decision about which
property to make an offer on, and at what price.
.Buyers are likely to discover the existence of psychologically stigmatizing events
when they meet the neighbors. The buyers may feel cheated out of the chance to
decide whether that information made the property unattractive to them or whether that
information would affect what they would be willing to pay for that property. Their
feelings of anger and betrayal may be transferred to the property, making them
dissatisfied with properties otherwise acceptable simply because they feel cheated.
Another factor complicates the situation for buyers. They may reasonably feel that
they have become the innocent victims of an unfair practice, i.e., society has shifted
the burden of the psychological stigma to them in order to protect the prior owners.
They have been stuck with a property that they may no longer want because of their
personal beliefs or sensitivities, but it may not be resalable without a loss because of
the stigma. After all, reselling it without a loss means selling at a price higher than
their purchase price in order to cover the transaction costs. However, if another buyer
ignorant of the facts cannot be located, it is unlikely that the property can be resold
even for the same price at which it was bought. The fact that sellers and their brokers
will not be disclosing the psychologically tainting events does not mean that the
information is not Imown or easily discovered by many otherwise potential buyers.
Furthermore, while quick turn-around sales might seem good for the real estate
brokerage industry in the short run because of the production of multiple commissions,
they will undermine public confidence in the long run. If brokers cannot be trusted
to provide the needed information, then buyers may not use them, seeking to reach the
market through other avenues, such as sales by individual owners, nonbroker services,
and recent advances in the use of the Internet.
The ill will produced toward brokers will be magnified in states that allow buyers
to make inquiries of sellers only when the buyers know that they should ask and do
it in the proper way."9 Buyers would not ordinarily think to make such inquiries
unless they knew that the information was not being disclosed in the first place. Even
if they suspected that the information was not being disclosed, most would not think
to ask unless prodceed to do so by the expert on whom they are relying for advice.
This puts brokers in a difficult position. Should the brokers warn buyers of events
which might psychologically stigmatize property and explain the possibility of asking
sellers if such events have occurred?
It seems clear that brokers who are acting as sellers' agents would be breaching
their fiduciary duty to the sellers by calling attention even to the possibility that
psychologically stigmatizing events might have taken place. Conversely, brokers
acting solely as buyers' agents would have a fiduciary duty to deliver that warning.
But brokers acting as dual agents or nonagent facilitators are in dangerous and
uncharted territory. Moreover, any broker or salesperson who calls attention to the
possibility that the prior owner or occupant had AIDS or HIV might be violating the
Fair Housing Act just by raising that red flag. Moreover, just raising the possibility
190. Connecticut, Delaware, New York, and Oklahoma provide for such an inquiry. See their
sections in Part II supra.
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might be misinterpreted by a buyer as a hint that the broker knows of a specific
problem with the property.
Some of these problems can be easily remedied in states that require written
disclosures about property conditions. A mandatory warning could be added to the
property condition disclosure forms describing the way state law deals with
psychological stigma. For example, it could include a warning that the seller is not
required to disclose certain information that could be considered psychologically
stigmatizing and that brokers are prohibited from disclosing that type of information
even if they know it. Since the property condition disclosure statement is one that is
likely to get close scrutiny by buyers, placing the warning there should effectively
eliminate buyers' expectations that all relevant information has been or must be
disclosed. Furthermore, in states that allow buyers to inquire, the disclosure statement
should explain that process. This remedy will at least level the playing field for the
vast majority of potential buyers and will inform buyers that there is some inequality
in the information available that their brokers cannot be expected to remedy. It would
give all buyers equal warning about the limits of disclosure by sellers and, more
importantly, the limits on information that can be provided by brokers.
But warnings would not entirely eliminate buyers' fears that they might get stuck
with properties that others know are stigmatized; on the contrary, it might even
initially stir up those fears. At least it would establish in buyers' minds that this
information will not have to be disclosed in resales and that the information is not
being disclosed on any property. Thus, buying stigmatized property is a risk inherent
in the purchase of any property, not just the property under consideration. Seeing the
warning might encourage buyers to utilize other resources to research possible stigmas,
perhaps even giving rise to a whole new, and probably underground, 9' industry of
service providers.
The limit to this solution is that not all states require sellers and sellers' brokers to
make disclosures about property conditions. For states without such requirements,
buyers should be informed in some other way. Requiring brokers to give buyers a
written warning about psychologically stigmatized property statutes when making their
disclosures about the broker-customer relationship might work, but it is unlikely to be
a meaningful disclosure since it will become part of an already overly technical and
incomprehensible document that attempts to explain legal concepts to the untrained
public."n Making the warning a separate disclosure form would not be much better
as it would still be part of a series of documents that would tend to overload average
buyers who may ignore them as only more legal details. Moreover, this would only
work where a broker was involved in the sale. It seems that the best solution would
be for those states not yet requiring property condition disclosures to join that trend
and, as part of the enactment, include a standard notice that psychologically
stigmatizing events will not be disclosed.
191. It may be necessary for states that are serious about eliminating psychological stigma from the
factors involved in the decision to purchase real estate to outlaw purchasing or selling such information.
192. See Brown et al., supra note 188, at 72-77.
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It is hypothesized that providing a conspicuous written warning with the property
condition disclosures would take brokers out of their present awkward situation. It
would strengthen the real estate market by eliminating a source of distrust, and it is
consistent with the current spirit of consumer protection which is eroding the caveat
emptor doctrine. It should not cause any impediment to sales of stigmatized
properties, at least not in the states that do not provide an inquiry mechanism. In the
end, it may also prove to be therapeutic and educational because every party to a real
estate transaction would be informed that the state does not think these events are
worth being considered by a reasonable person making a real estate purchase.
IV. Conclusion
The current crop of statutes that protect the nondisclosure of psychologically
stigmatizing events produce unintended negative consequences. These results are
primarily the product of the public's ignorance of the statutes' existence and,
subsequently, brokers being placed in the awkward position of having to decide
whether they can or should warn potential buyers about them. Notifying the buying
public about these statutes and their effect in the place that is most likely to attract
buyers' interest, the property condition disclosure, is a simple but effective solution.
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APPENDIX: Chart of Psychological Stigma Shield Laws
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